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DRED SCOTT AND JOHN ELK

LAWYERS

By J. W. Kelley, of the Denver Bar
who select for light reading the opinions of
the United States Supreme Court will find two curious
cases which, while almost identical in the legal questions involved, were strangely dissimilar in their historical
effect upon the public mind.
The first is Dred Scott vs. Sanford, 19 Howard 393. Dred
Scott sued in the Federal Court, and to do so it was necessary
that he be a citizen of the State in which he sued. A plea to
his declaration set up the fact that Dred Scott was a negro of
African descent whose ancestors were slaves of pure African
blood. Dred Scott demurred to this exemplification of his
pedigree and a majority of the Supreme Court of the United
States, on appeal, said, "a free negro of the African race,
whose ancestors were brought to this country and sold as
slaves, is not a 'citizen' within the meaning of the constitution."
The opinions, pro and con, occupied 240 printed pages, but
that was the rule given.
Four years of civil war followed, precipitated, some
claim, by this decision. Then came the Fourteenth Amendment providing that "all persons born or naturalized in the
United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside."
This amendment was supposed to have set aside the rule
of the Dred Scott case. Not so, however.
In Omaha, Nebraska, in 1880, an Indian named John
Elk, who had been separated from his tribe for several years
and was engaged in the then necessary occupation of driving
a hack on the streets of the Nebraska metropolis, applied to
one Charles Wilkins, an election official of the Fifth Ward, to
be registered as a voter at the coming election. Wilkins refused to register him, and Elk sued for $6,000.00 damages in
the United States Circuit Court of the District of Nebraska,
alleging his citizenship of that State and the further fact that
he was an Indian, born here, and his consequent right to vote.
The Elk case then followed the path beaten by Dred
Scott in 1854. Wilkins filed a general demurrer and the Circuit Court sustained it. When the case reached the Supreme
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Court of the United States, Judge Gray wrote the opinion and
followed the rule announced in the Dred Scott case. His opinion contained all the copious learning on the subject that could
be derived from the Dred Scott case with such variations as
were necessary in a case when an Indian instead of a Negro
claimed to be an American citizen by means apparently not
provided for by the Constitution. Elk vs. Wilkins, 112 U. S.
94.
Justices Harlan and Woods dissented and their opinion is
as rich with reason and authority as were the dissenting opinions in the Dred Scott case. It is plain, from reading these
opinions, that the language of the Constitution is not always
and everywhere exactly clear and plain, even where clarified
by amendments.
But no dreadful consequences followed the refusal to
allow John Elk the right to sue in a Federal Court. No armies
with banners assembled to vindicate the rights of the humble
Jehu of pure Indian descent. Congress merely passed an act
providing that Indians, voluntarily separated from their tribes
for more than one year, became ipso facto citizens of the
United States and thereby the descending lines of Eiks were
merged with the Scotts to mingle with what has sometimes
been referred to as the heterogeneous mass of our citizenry.
Lawyers, judges or law-makers, who have in mind employing the apparently all embracing words "citizen" or "all
persons" are respectfully referred to the two cases cited herein
for guidance. The words, apparently, do not comprehend as
much as might be supposed.

